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ABSTRACT 
After Smith’s statement of the market virtues the process of gestation of economic policy as a 
consistent set of rules for public agenda has been rather slow. Until not so long ago economic 
policy as a discipline was confined to prescribing practical rules intended to explain technical 
procedures of government intervention. Economic policy as a coherent and to some extent 
autonomous discipline emerged in the late 1950s in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands 
and Italy, when solid foundations indicating market failures and a theory about conditions for 
policy effectiveness and design had been developed. This paper intends to explain the reasons 
for its emergence, the circumstances which helped it to be taught in many Scandinavian, Dutch 
and Italian universities and a few other European ones, the reasons for its apparent setback 
and some factors that could facilitate its diffusion in the next years. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the process through which the discipline of economic policy as 
a set of consistent rules for public agenda to some extent autonomous from 
economic analysis emerged in Scandinavian countries
 
and the Netherlands after 
Adam Smith’s statement of the virtues of competitive markets2. It also deals with 
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2
 We are conscious that attribution to Smith of the naïf idea of a fully pro-market position – in 
particular the prevailing interpretation of the meaning of the invisible hand – is unfounded in 
Smith’s works and has been criticized by a number of authors (e.g., Grampp, 2000; 
Rothschild, 2001; Roncaglia, 2005; Marglin, 2008). However, we must distinguish two different 
issues: the first one is whether it is appropriate to refer to the term ‘invisible hand’ with respect 
to either the letter of Smith’s works (in particular in The wealth of nations) or the context where 
it appears; a separate issue is whether it is representative of Smith’s thought as arguing in 
favour of the virtues of the market. Scarce recurrence of the term in Smith’s works or the 
possible inappropriateness of the citations where Smith makes use of this term for arguing in 
favour of the virtues of the market (typical is the case of the home bias in Smith, 1776, Book 
IV, chapter 2) are founded, but refer to the first issue. We are however interested in the latter. 
From a substantive point of view, undoubtedly Adam Smith gives a positive assessment of the 
market, whose operation – in his opinion – usually tends to pursue the public good in a 
number of ways, especially by favouring the division of labour. In any case, we use the term 
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some factors that brought the discipline to a decline – in particular as an effect of 
the destructive critique of a part of its ‘core’ – and with some recent theoretical 
advances that could contribute to its resurgence. The paper then devotes some 
space to how the discipline developed in Italy, as some such advances have 
recently emerged there. 
Obviously, the discipline could not have emerged in the absence of a diffuse 
position by economists in favour of state intervention to correct or substitute 
markets. After Smith a stiffer line of reasoning had indeed developed in the 
economic discipline asserting the reasons for a ‘night-watchman’ state. This had 
been inaugurated by Bastiat (1851) and Spencer (1850) and was later prosecuted 
by Pareto’s Cours d’économie politique (Pareto, 1896-1897), finally leading to 
Nozick (1974), Hayek (1960), Buchanan (1975), Tullock (1976)
3
. In Italy, the 
minimal state doctrine had a number of followers, starting with Ferrara (e.g., see 
Ferrara, 1859)
4
 and, as said, Pareto of the Cours d’économie (Pareto, 1896-
1897).  
Over the years the ‘night-watchman’ position became an exception as most 
classical and marginalist economists tended to state a number of specific or 
general cases where government intervention was in order. All the same, until the 
1930s there was no ‘logic’ (i.e., no set of general principles) for co-ordinated and 
consistent policy action in a market economy. Economic policy as a discipline was 
confined to a set of practical rules intended to assert technical procedures of 
government intervention, particularly in the realm of microeconomics (customs 
policy, price controls) and monetary theory. Theoretical contributions on the theory 
of international trade and the balance of payment adjustment were considered as 
specific parts of the economic discipline. In Italy, the contributions of Pareto’s 
Manuel (Pareto, 1906) and Barone (1908) had left only limited (but significant, as 
we will see) seeds on the side of mathematical economics, welfare economics (as 
the logic of economic policy) and the theory of economic policy
5
, which were later 
used by the international scientific community as bricks for building economic 
policy as an autonomous discipline.  
                                                                                                                                                         
‘invisible hand’ as a metaphor of the Smithian position as well as of later theories, in particular 
neo-classical thinking, which has then prevailed, even if the latter are deprived of some social 
aspects of the working of the market that certainly were in Adam Smith. We are less interested 
in theories, such as the institutionalist ones, advocating government intervention in market 
economies. 
3
 The different arguments put forward by Bastiat, Spencer and Pareto in support of their minimal 
state doctrine are reconstructed by Romani (2013). The post-World War II contributions of the 
same orientation can be considered as a re-appraisal of the Smithian attitude in favour of a 
minimal state as a consequence of comparing different institutions (Screpanti, Zamagni, 1989: 
378), enriched by the emergence of socialist experience.  
4
 A complete reconstruction of Ferrara’s view on the principles to be jointly satisfied for justifying 
government intervention into the economy (general interest, necessity and advantage over 
private action) and on their inexistence in practically all the real cases is given by Berardi 
(1894). 
5
 In what follows I will refer to the ‘theory of economic policy’ as that part of the discipline of 
economic policy that deals with conditions for consistent and successful policy action. 
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Until the 1930s public finance had a higher status than economic policy 
worldwide, as it had developed a theory of public goods and a conception of the 
role of the state, with important contributions by Italian and Scandinavian 
scholars
6
. A subject such as macroeconomic analysis and policy barely existed, 
as these only started with Keynes (1936) contribution, which however was not 
easily accepted in Italy and some other European countries.  
In the 1930s and the following decades further essential seeds were added. On 
the side of the logic for government intervention in market economies, a debate 
involving some leading economists of the time began on the principles of 
government intervention, the role of distributive considerations vis-à-vis those of 
efficiency, the need for effective or potential compensation and the possibility of 
taking both efficiency and distributional aspects into consideration in order to 
maximise a society’s economic welfare starting from individual preferences. The 
concept of macroeconomic market failures also emerged in addition to the 
microeconomic ones already stated (by Sidgwick, Marshall, Pigou, etc.). On the 
other side, the possibility of empirical testing of theoretical propositions as a 
consequence of the birth of econometrics gave the possibility of taking into 
account the multiple interrelations existing in an economic system for coordinating 
government interventions directed to a set of different targets.   
These advances made it possible for an autonomous discipline to finally sprout 
in Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands in the 1950s. The geographical 
location of the fathers of the discipline was the product of a number of 
circumstances: not only the political trends and the social substrate prevailing in 
these countries, but also their full participation to the wave of theoretical 
innovations that had produced the slow but steady developments of the essential 
seeds of the discipline. Italy had been rather isolated from such developments 
during the Fascist phase, but in the 1950s it was ready to import theoretical 
advances abroad, as a result of the concurrence of specific circumstances, rather 
different, however, from those operating in Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands. Starting late did not prevent theorists in this country from soon 
borrowing the new discipline, in the 1960s and to contribute – in the years after 
2005, together with other theorists well trained in the original theory - possibly 
decisive advances for its re-emergence after the  long decline begun in the 1970s.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section will deal with the first, 
non-systematic, attempts of economists within the neo-classical approach to 
indicate cases for government intervention. Section 3 investigates theoretical 
advances in the Thirties that made it possible to devise economic policy as an 
autonomous discipline. Section 4 discusses the foundations and articulation of 
economic policy in some countries of Continental Europe and its practical 
                                                          
6
 See Pantaleoni (1883), De Viti De Marco (1888), Mazzola (1890), Lindahl (1919), Wicksell 
(1926). According to Einaudi (1934), Italian economists’ contributions made it possible for 
public finance to acquire a scientific status. A similar appreciation came later by Buchanan 
(1960) and Musgrave and Peacock (1994). Scandinavian contributions are well known, as 
Lindahl (1919) was originally published in German and soon reviewed in an English-speaking 
journal (Peck, 1921). 
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absence in other European and non-European countries. Section 5 deals with 
developments of the discipline in Italy in the 1960s. Section 6 discusses some 
possible reasons explaining why the developments of economic policy in 
Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy had a limited impact in Europe (and 
elsewhere). Section 7 deals with the main theoretical objections raised against the 
conception of Economic policy as a consistent and autonomous discipline. Section 
8 concludes. 
 
 
2. ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE EARLY 1930S: A LITTLE MORE THAN A COLLECTION OF EXAMPLES OF 
EMPIRICAL POLICY. 
 
Most classical writers and the marginalists had suggested cases where public 
intervention was in order. This had been so for Smith (1776), Ricardo (1817), Mill 
(1848), Marshall (1890), Walras (1874-1877, 1898). But these cases were mainly 
what Walras called ‘examples of empirical policy’ rather than consistent policy. 
They were certainly dictated on the basis of an analytical evaluation of the 
circumstances suggesting them, but were not part of a systematic and consistent 
assessment of the foundations and the articulation of public policy. 
A systematic discipline of the foundations of government intervention (what was 
later called welfare economics – or became a part of social choice theory, first and 
implementation theory, more recently - and can be considered as the ‘logic of 
economic policy’) only began to emerge towards the end of the Eighteen century. 
The first attempts to develop such a theory were those of Sidgwick (1883), whose 
treatise had economic policy as an object in its third part. Similarly, Marshall 
(1890) and Pigou (1912, 1920) had also laid down essential principles for state 
intervention, partly connecting it to the preferences of citizens. These had been 
produced not only as an almost occasional and case-by-case by-product of 
analytical investigations (as it was for the ‘classics’), but had a systematic corpus 
of principles and justified a number of microeconomicy policy interventions. 
However, apart from their debatable foundations (utilitarianism
7
), these principles 
were condemned to be dormant for a long while, until the 1930s. In addition, the 
cases of market failures requiring public intervention had still to be studied. It is 
paradoxical that the general principles on which these were later asserted had 
already been put forward by Pareto (1906), whose principle was interpreted as 
supporting the virtues of markets for a long time. Some developments, as for 
macroeconomic market failures, had to wait for Keynes’s contribution8, even if 
seeds had been laid for its emergence. Especially relevant in our perspective are: 
the influence on Keynes of Wicksell’s theory integrating the monetary and real 
                                                          
7
 On the utilitarian roots of Marshall’s thought see Dardi (2010). 
8
 Stiglitz (1986: ch.4) first formally recognized unemployment and inflation as cases of 
macroeconomic market failures. Other macroeconomic failures can also be added to these, 
such as those deriving from low (or excessive, unsustainable) growth or external imbalances, 
for which we refer to Acocella (1994). 
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sectors (Wicksell, 1898)
9
; the demonstration by the Stockholm School
10
 of how 
employment can be stimulated by economic policy, which originally appeared 
before Keynes (Ohlin, 1937)
11
. 
Asymmetric information as a cause of market failures came much later (Akerlof, 
1970). Finally, the issue of consistency among different policy actions, which had 
to become even more important as the realm of policy actions widened, had not 
been raised yet. This first appeared, in 1952, with Tinbergen’s famous theorem in 
the theory of economic policy (that achieving multiple targets requires at least so 
many policy instruments)
12
. Awareness of interdependence among economic 
variables certainly existed, especially after the emergence of the theory of general 
equilibrium, but to prove the significance of that point statistically for policy had to 
wait for the birth of econometrics.  
 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 30S: THE SEEDS FOR THE BIRTH OF ECONOMIC POLICY AS AN 
AUTONOMOUS DISCIPLINE. 
 
This situation rapidly changed after WWII as a result of four developments in the 
theory that had emerged in the Thirties.  
First, the development of the ‘new welfare economics’ underlined the relevance 
of market failures at a micro level and contributed to the theory of justice. In 
particular, before WWII a large debate continuing after the war arose on basic 
principles of policy intervention such as that of compensation (Harrod, 1938; 
Hotelling, 1938; Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939; Scitovsky, 1941; Little, 1949) founded 
on the non-utilitaritarian bases laid down by Pareto. Bergson (1938) introduced 
the notion of a social welfare function, but Arrow (1950, 1951) later showed the 
difficulty of arriving at such a function by starting from individual values. After the 
war the various market failures were investigated in a systematic way, thus 
offering justifications for government intervention. A summary of these advances 
is expressed by Kapp (1950) and Bator (1958).  
Second, the advent of the Keynesian thought (Keynes, 1936), which had soon 
developed as the new orthodoxy, introduced a new important case of market 
failure and the need for government intervention.   
A third factor came from the new discipline of econometrics, as a development 
of mathematical economics that permitted to empirically assess the values of the 
system’s parameters and interrelations (Tinbergen, 1935, quoted by Hughes 
                                                          
9
 E.g., Laidler (1999), Hirai T. (2008), Arnon (2011). 
10
 D. Hammarskjöld, A. Johansson, K. Kock, E. Lindahl, E. Lundberg, G. Myrdal, B. Ohlin, and I. 
Svennilsson were part of the School (Kærgård, Sandelin and Sæther, 2008). On this School 
see Jonung (1991). 
11
 However, Carlson, Jonung (2013) shows that there seems to have been an interaction 
between Keynes’s and Ohlin’s ideas. When Swedish economists first read the General Theory 
they thought that ‘Keynes ideas were tracking the views already developed in Sweden’ and 
reacted that Keynes was too ‘classic’ and little innovative, which made him increasingly 
irritated (Jonung, 2013: 2). 
12
 See Hughes Hallett (1989) for a historical and analytical discussion.  
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Hallett, 1989). Construction of formal models to be tested against reality 
introduced the idea of the need for consistency of different public policies and the 
possibility to check their real effectiveness. This factor played an essential role for 
developing the theory of economic policy. It then appears not so strange that the 
authors who first contributed to this theory, i.e. Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch, 
were among the founders of the Econometric society and the Journal 
‘Econometrica’ in the early 1930s. Tinbergen built the first econometric models of 
the Dutch and the US economies in 1936 and 1939, respectively (Hughes Hallett, 
1989). From this activity the theory of economic policy easily followed. In fact, 
Tinbergen (1952, 1956) developed a theory in terms of ‘fixed targets’, suggesting 
that a number of instruments at least equal to that of targets should be available to 
the policymaker in order for him to be able to exactly reach the set of target values 
he preferred (Tinbergen’s golden rule of economic policy). Frisch (1949, 1950, 
1957) instead stated a theory of economic policy in terms of ‘flexible targets’13 and 
its route was later followed by Theil (1956, 1964) and became the general way of 
setting a policy problem in a ‘parametric context’: the policymaker, in the same 
vein as a household, tends to maximize his preferences, or to minimize a loss 
function in terms of quadratic deviations from a set of target values for the 
variables of interest, under the constraint of a set of equations describing the 
given behavior of the economic system. In the case where he has a sufficient 
number of instruments - as indicated by Tinbergen’s golden rule - the loss function 
is minimized and the set of target values is reached.
14
  
Finally, planned economies experienced high growth rates in the Thirties and 
the following decades, which contributed to the idea that governments could be 
successful in ruling economic systems, possibly even more than markets, which 
were hit by the Great Depression
15
. 
 
 
4. FOUNDATION AND ARTICULATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
 
                                                          
13
 Even if the approach followed by Frisch was different from that of Tinbergen, the latter 
recognized his theory was somewhat inspired by Frisch’s approach (Tinbergen, 1952). 
14
 The Norwegian school of the theory of economic policy, founded by Frisch, had also other 
economists following his route: O. Aukrust, H. J. Kreyberg, B. Thalberg and, most importantly, 
T. Haavelmo (most of his works relevant to our topic are in Norwegian, e.g., Haavelmo, 1956, 
1966) and L. Johansen (Johansen, 1977, 1978). Bent Hansen - a Danish-born economist 
graduated at Uppsala University – became an influential advisor to the Swedish government 
and professor at Stockholm (and Berkeley) and offered an independent contribution to the 
goals-means theory of economic policy (see Hansen, 1955; Erixon, 2011). For a rather 
exhaustive review of the contributions of Scandinavian and Dutch authors to the theory of 
economic policy refer also to Rey (1967), Hughes Hallett (1989) and Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, 
Hughes Hallett (2012).  
15
 This was one of the reasons why Frisch and Johansen thought that national economic 
planning managed by well-trained economists was clearly superior to the market (Kærgård, 
Sandelin and Sæther, 2008). 
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These developments led to the foundation of the discipline of economic policy in 
part of Continental Europe, specifically in Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands.  
Zeuthen (1958) was the first (and successful) attempt to offer a systematic and 
consistent summary of developments in welfare economics and the theory of 
economic policy, as cornerstones of economic policy as an autonomous 
discipline
16
. An explicit link between these two cornerstones was supplied by 
those economists who suggested to derive social welfare functions from official 
documents and statements or interviews with policymakers (Frisch (1957, 1970)
17
, 
following suggestions made by Bergson (1938), Samuelson (1947), and failing the 
possibility to construct them directly from individual preferences when some 
reasonable axioms were assumed, as shown by Arrow (1950,1951)
18
. 
The logic of economic policy and the theory of economic policy constituted the 
‘core’ of what has been called the ‘classical’ or ‘normative’ theory of economic 
policy, as they investigate, at an abstract level, some of the preconditions for 
existence and efficient management of public policy: i.e., cases of market failures 
and consistency of policy action addressing such failures. They entered the 
curricula of master degrees in Scandinavian universities in the 1960s and 1970s 
through Tinbergen (1956), Zeuthen (1958), Johansen (1977, 1978), etc. as 
textbooks.  
Why did such a discipline – in particular the theory of economic policy – develop 
only in those countries of Continental Europe? This is a very difficult issue to deal 
with. I will try to indicate some of the relevant factors, but a more accurate map of 
the rise of the discipline and the factors favouring or hindering it in each country 
should be drawn on a country specific basis.  
One might argue that development of economic policy as an autonomous 
normative discipline was natural for countries that had adopted (indicative) 
planning for their economies, even if Zeuthen had warned that the theory of 
economic policy was not only necessary for planned economies, but also useful 
for less interventionist societies, because of the need to ensure their policy 
choices are kept mutually consistent. In fact, ‘economic policy action changing 
according to moods can be extremely harmful’ (Zeuthen, 1958: 133 Italian tr.). 
Undoubtedly, complexity of economic policy and the need for coordinating the 
various fields of action are more acute where the goals of policy action to correct 
markets are more ambitious and widespread. This could rather easily explain why 
such a theory never developed in the United States where the dominant credo 
                                                          
16
 The importance of this book for the development of economic policy as an autonomous 
discipline in Italy must be stressed, as it was translated into Italian in 1961. 
17
 In his Nobel lecture, Frisch states some of the rules to be followed for deriving such a function 
– as a first stage in the process of cooperation between experts and politicians - and adds that 
he had a number of tests of the practical effectiveness of this procedure. The whole Institute 
directed by Frisch and a number of economists also abroad tried to develop such method. 
Here we only mention a couple of works by Dutch and French-speaking economists: Van Eijk, 
Sandee (1959), Kirschen, Morissens (1964). 
18
 This topic will be discussed again in section 7.  
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was one of scarce public interventions, with the exception of unemployment and 
anti-inflationary policies
19
. In a similar vein one could say that this was the case 
also of Germany, where macroeconomic action was typically less relevant and 
mainly directed to an anti-inflationary target.  
However, this explanation would scarcely fit the case of the United Kingdom 
where there was a vast array of public actions, including – in addition to 
macroeconomic policy – extensive recourse to public enterprises and the welfare 
state but neither the theory of economic policy nor the whole discipline of 
economic policy developed as a discipline, even if extensive contributions were 
made to systematic national accounting (e.g., Stone, Croft-Murray, 1959)
20
. The 
only attempt made in order to build a systematic set of logical alternatives as a 
guide to action was made by Meade (1951, 1955), who, however, succeeded in 
pursuing his target only partially, i.e. specifically with respect to international 
economic policy and not in more abstract and general terms
21
.  
Nor would it explain the absence of a theory of economic policy in France, 
where the government played an important role in a number of fields and 
indicative plans were prepared for some decades after WW II. Perhaps, other 
factors – in addition to those of a casual nature – were relevant. So, in order to 
explain absence of a discipline rationalizing state intervention in countries with a 
large role of the state in the economy, some importance could be attributed to the 
general attitude toward science, e.g., positivism in Anglo-Saxon countries (as this 
type of epistemology denies a scientific status to normative statements), or the 
limited role of economists vis-à-vis politicians and bureaucrats in France. On the 
other hand, homogeneity of Scandinavian and Dutch societies
22
, relative 
                                                          
19
 The few textbooks on economic policy published in the United States usually lacked 
systematic treatment of the general ends of public economic action, dealing mainly with more 
or less technical notions of the economic policy instruments that can be used to further 
specific ends (e.g., see Boulding, 1958; Norton, 1966). A partial exception is Watson (1960), 
which has many features of a complete textbook on economic policy, including a (short) 
discussion of welfare economics and market failures, but lacks any reference to the theory of 
economic policy.  
20
 An explanation could be that public intervention in Britain was so obvious that there was no 
need to theorize it. This would however be against one of the main goals of the theory of 
economic policy, i.e. the need for consistency of the various policy actions. Another partial 
explanation of this apparent exception of Britain to host a ‘school’ of economic policy could be 
that in the 1950s and the following decade the attention of at least part of the academic left in 
Britain was directed to some alternative target, i.e. developing a more radical critique of the 
prevailing marginalist credo, as done by the Neo-Ricardians. Over time, policy attitudes 
towards laissez-faire and government intervention changed, suggesting to dismantle positive 
policy action. 
21
 Meade’s analysis deals with the use of multiple instruments to pursue various targets at the 
same time, in particular balance of payments equilibrium, full employment and, more 
generally, economic welfare. 
22
 The very notion of a unitary Scandinavian economic policy model has been debated 
(Pekkarinen, 1988), but the degree of homogeneity of the Scandinavian societies - certainly 
within each country (see, e.g., Bjerkholt, 1998, 2005, for Norway) and to a large extent also 
with respect to other European countries – was and still is very high. In particular, two features 
common to all Scandinavian countries are incomes policy and other institutions typical of this 
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weakness of groups in favour of specific interests and acceptance of the 
implications of a social consensus tended to facilitate a unifying approach to 
policymaking; in addition, an important role might have derived from existence of 
bodies composed by economists intermediating between politicians and 
bureaucrats for devising a set of consistent policies
23
.  
Some other traits of Scandinavian (and possibly Dutch) academics should be 
noticed, i.e., their relatively asymmetric openness to international intellectual 
circuits. Living in small countries, they learnt and could speak foreign languages, 
really more German than English up to the second world war, but often wrote in 
their native language. Exchanges among the scholars of the different 
Scandinavian countries were guaranteed by regular Scandinavian conferences 
and a ‘Marstrand Meeting’ for Scandinavian economic researchers since 1936 
and until 1985 (Kærgård, Sandelin and Sæther, 2008).
24
 This made it possible for 
developments abroad to penetrate each Scandinavian country and to spread in 
the region, but might also have delayed or made it difficult for some ideas 
introduced there to be absorbed abroad, thus impairing future developments of 
the discipline. 
A final important factor that could explain the birth of economic policy as a 
discipline in Scandinavian countries is the tendency of Scandinavian economists 
to tune into public debate on economic policy issues, by writing in the home press 
and journals, participating to debates confronting them with politicians and 
policymakers and, sometimes, turned to politics
25
. 
These factors raise a final issue, which is important from a methodological point 
of view. In trying to explain the emergence of economic policy as a discipline we 
have referred first to theoretical developments in the field of economic science 
and then to some features of the various countries and societies as well as to the 
nature of current political attitudes in each. This way of proceeding is necessary 
                                                                                                                                                         
particular version of capitalism (the so-called Nordic model). In so far as the Netherlands are 
concerned, notwithstanding existence of a similar degree of social homogeneity, one must 
consider that at the end of the war the Government was an uneasy coalition of different 
political parties (Hughes Hallett, 1989: 192).  
23
 A Centraal Plan Bureau was instituted in the Netherlands in 1945. In Norway a Planning 
department was created at the Ministry of Finance in the 1950s that, together with the 
Statistical Bureau of Census and the Institute of Economics of the University of Oslo, 
constituted an ‘Iron Triangle’ for the build-up of economic planning in Norway (Eriksen, 
Hanisch and Sæther, 2008). A very detailed account of the interaction between theoretical 
innovations and the use of macroeconomic models for policy making, especially under the 
influence of Frisch, is in Bjerkholt (1998). 
24
 In each Scandinavian country there was a main economic national journal and national 
languages were the normal vehicle of expressing or discuss new ideas (Kærgård, Sandelin 
and Sæther, 2008). However, some of the main contributions (especially books, including the 
main works by Wicksell and Lindahl, and doctoral dissertations) were in German. Until 1917 
more than 50% of foreign books acquired by Swedish research libraries were in German 
(Palson Syl, Sandelin, 2001) and only after WWI and the Nazi regime there was a de-
Germanisation of Swedish economics (Sandelin, 2001). 
25
 On the Swedish experience an important source is Carlson, Jonung (2006), but this also hints 
at other Scandinavian countries.  
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because of a certain lack of correspondence exists between developments in the 
economic science – which certainly have now an international span and to some 
extent were already so around WWII - and current policy debates in each country, 
as the international community of economists is to some extent separated from 
the public and private decision makers, interest groups, the press, other scientists 
and the general public in each country (Acocella, 2013). The two communities 
interact in a way that can be thought as being conducive to a policy model that is 
specifically national, with some degree of nation-wide coherence. They still do so 
now after a further wave of globalization, even if less so than in previous decades. 
In explaining the birth of economic policy as a discipline in Scandinavian countries 
we can thus speak of a kind of national (economic) policy model, as done by 
Pekkarinen (1988) in dealing with an issue central to our analysis but of a more 
limited content, that of Keynesianism and the framework of policy ideas prevailing 
in Scandinavian countries. The model ‘is created out of the broad structural, 
cultural, social and institutional contest of each country’ (Pekkarinen, 1988: 4). 
These factors all converged in Scandinavian countries to produce a context 
favourable to the birth of a discipline such as economic policy
26
.  
 
 
5. ECONOMIC POLICY IN ITALY SINCE THE 1960S 
 
In Italy economic policy was hardly taught or investigated as a discipline, at least 
until mid-1930s. Most Italian economists, who were usually engaged in the 
administration of practical policies, had followed the autarchy and corporatism 
credo dictated by the Fascist regime; but, being largely isolated from theoretical 
developments abroad, did not possess many of the instruments necessary for a 
systematic approach to economic policy. Trade and colonial policy and law and 
banking policy were its main substitute. 
By mid-1930s a specific term for the discipline was finally forged: Politica 
economica, i.e. Economic policy (e.g., see Fontana Russo, 1935),
27
 although its 
content remained pretty much the same as before. In the early 1950s practically 
only a few Italian scholars had introduced – or were about to introduce – 
Keynesian thought in Italy, starting from G. U. Papi, A. Franchini Stappo, V. 
Marrama, F. Di Fenizio and F. Caffè.
28
 Even fewer Italian scholars had studied 
progresses in welfare economics (Caffè in 1953 and Lombardini in 1954),
29
 which 
is apparently strange, as these were based on Paretian foundations and there 
                                                          
26
 Possibly the common cultural ascendant in Scandinavian countries of economic policy as an 
autonomous discipline can be traced back to Wicksell. Wicksell’s socialist orientation, his 
support for the welfare state, his critical analysis of Pareto’s maximum principle for which see 
Palsson Syll, Sandelin (2001), his analyses of macroeconomic failures in terms of employment 
and inflation are all elements having an influence on many posts of the future discipline. 
27
 A previous text by this same author referred to trade treaties and policy (Fontana Russo, 
1902). 
28
 Papi (1953), Franchini Stappo (1955), Marrama (1961); Di Fenizio (various years).  
29
 Caffè (1953, 1956a); Lombardini, (1954); Caffè’s translation of some essays in welfare 
economics (Caffè, 1956b); Caffè’s translation of Zeuthen (1958) (Caffé, 1961). 
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were academics following Pareto’s method, such as L. Amoroso.30 Similarly, very 
few scholars had done the same thing for the theory of economic policy (Caffè, 
Marrama and, to some extent, Di Fenizio)
31
. In some cases theoretical advances 
abroad were introduced under the form of textbooks by Italian authors
32
. In other 
cases some Italian journals hosted either important original articles by foreign 
authors or their translations
33
. Translations of books or essays collected as books 
also played an important role.
34
 The intellectual openness of the economists 
mentioned was crucial also in their propensity to encourage their pupils to 
complete their preparation abroad, mainly in the United Kingdom and the US. 
By the beginning of the 1960s in Italy there were all the premises for devising a 
consistent and rather autonomous set of propositions to fill the discipline of 
Economic policy with new stuff. The only problem was about the weights to assign 
to the different possible ingredients. There were two main lines along which the 
discipline was systematically introduced, by two scholars: Federico Caffè and 
Ferdinando Di Fenizio. We discuss the former only here, as his contributions 
seem to have been more innovative with respect to our topic.  
Caffè had searched for all the possible key ingredients for conceiving economic 
policy as an autonomous discipline. Indeed he did so first by critically reviewing 
progresses in the development of welfare economics (Caffè, 1953, 1956a), then 
translating into Italian and editing a collection of papers on the new welfare 
economics and the social welfare function (Caffè, 1956b) and editing the Italian 
translation of Zeuthen (1958), finally publishing a textbook in two volumes on 
Economic policy (Caffè, 1966, 1970). A path to some extent similar to Caffe’s was 
followed by a group of economists in Naples, led by Augusto Graziani, who wrote 
a book containing first foundations for public economic action, then the theory of 
economic policy, and finally detailed policies aiming at specific short- or long-run 
targets (D’Antonio, Graziani, Vinci, 1972, 1979)35.  
For many years these, together with a few others were the main economic policy 
textbooks circulating in Italy, widely adopted in most universities. After 1990 other 
textbooks were written along lines similar to those of Caffè and D’Antonio, 
                                                          
30
 Pareto had a very extensive, if lagged, impact on the academic profession abroad, in 
particular, for what we are interested in in this paper, not only for his welfare principle but also 
for laying down the tools of mathematical economics that contributed to the foundation of 
econometrics (Tinbergen, 1949). A number of academics such as L. Amoroso had followed his 
teaching only in so far as the use of mathematics for economic analysis was concerned.   
31
 Caffè’s translation of Zeuthen (1958), Marrama (1962), Di Fenizio (various years). 
32
 Di Fenizio (various years), Marrama (1948).  
33
 This was the case of a number of contributions - by Frisch, Tinbergen, Theil, and, outside the 
proper realm of economic policy, Shackle and even Kurt Godel - published in ‘L’industria’, a 
journal edited by F. Di Fenizio, and ‘Metroeconomica’, founded and edited by E. Fossati. 
34
 F. Caffè, who didn’t edit any journal, made an extensive use of translations to provide Italian 
students and also the general public with accessible versions of foreign economic thought.  
35
 Other books, such as Rey (1967) and the work done in conjunction with the attempt to lay 
down a framework for the indicative planning schemes prepared by the central government 
applied some of the principles of the discipline, specifically those of the theory of economic 
policy. 
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Graziani, Vinci, but with greater attention to social choice and positive economic 
policy: Balducci Candela, 1991 (later Balducci, Candela, Scorcu, 2001, 2002), 
Acocella (1994, 1999) and Cagliozzi (1994). By including a positive approach in 
addition to the normative one, these books complemented the ‘normative’ theory 
of economic policy, thus completing the set of ingredients that can be ideally 
thought of constituting the discipline of economic policy. Some of these books also 
introduced the idea of economic policy as a game and discussed the implications 
on it of reputation, credibility and rules.
 36
 
Some of the Italian books that had developed and complemented the 
‘Scandinavian-Dutch’ approach to economic policy were translated into English 
and other foreign languages (such as Chinese, Polish, Croatian) and enter now  
the syllabus of some tertiary-level courses abroad
37
. Notwithstanding this, the 
approach has apparently failed to develop abroad at the same time when it was 
practically abandoned in the countries of origin of its ‘core’. 
 
 
6. WHY A LIMITED IMPACT IN EUROPE (AND ELSEWHERE)?  
 
Thus, the idea of economic policy as a discipline starting from welfare economics 
and social choice, including the normative and positive theory of economic policy 
and then dealing with specific policies and targets, with institutional and historical 
mediations before applying economic analysis, did not survive in the countries of 
origin and did not pass over to other countries. This is apparently strange. I offer 
four possible explanations that could jointly explain this setback:  
1. The specificity of circumstances favouring the emergence and flourishing 
of the discipline in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy. After all, these 
countries shared a common feature distinguishing them from other European 
countries: the weight and the left-wing orientation of the ‘intelligencija’ as well as 
of the political parties supporting the governments or of the strong opposition 
parties and institutions (such as trade unions) together with the idea that public 
happiness should be served by a visible hand. To this we should add another 
circumstance for Italy: an idealistic epistemological attitude of the Italian scientific 
community, the importance of the Marxist and Catholic credos – which are both 
pro-government – and the relevance of civil society. In order to explain why the 
idea of economic policy did not survive or pass over to other countries reference 
could be made not only to the absence of features similar to those just listed, but 
also to the strength of bureaucracy (including the status of the central bank) in 
some countries. This may ‘insulate policy from various political pressures, 
although it may also limit the influence of outside economic theorists over policy’ 
                                                          
36
 In addition to the books already cited, Persson, Tabellini (1990) dealt with issues of credibility 
and reputations that were familiar after the Lucas critique and Barro, Gordon (1983). To my 
knowledge the idea of policymaking as the interaction of governmental action with that of 
major private institutions was already in Caffè (1966), but he didn’t express it in detailed and 
formal terms. 
37
 This was the case for, e.g., Acocella (1994, 1999). 
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(Pekkarinen, 1988: 5), which could explain why a theory of economic policy did 
not develop in France and Germany.  
2. The rise and spread of the Anglo-Saxon school of thought, which has 
taken the lead over (other) national schools and traditions since the 1960s and 
has now led to a rather homogeneous literature, using the same language 
(English), the same methodology and building economic models based on similar 
visions and methodologies. This was due partly to a natural generational change 
and partly to the enhanced possibilities for circulating people and exchanging 
ideas that have favoured economic and cultural globalization in the last four to five 
decades. The flourishing Scandinavian and Dutch schools slowly disappeared as 
the impact of cultural globalization on smaller countries was quicker and higher
38
. 
It is natural that this homogeneity has been reached at the cost of taking national 
specificities out of the realm of analysis; it is not so natural that policy applications 
to solve specific issues in a given context follow after analysis with scarce 
reference to history and institutions, which is sometimes due to uncritical 
understanding of the respective contents of economic analysis and policy.
39
  
3. The negative attitude of mainstream Anglo-Saxon thinking towards active 
policy intervention, which matured in the two decades since the end of the 1960s; 
we refer in particular to: the introduction of the expectation-augmented Phillips 
curve and the assertion of a vertical long-run curve (Phelps, 1967; Friedman, 
1968); fiscal policy neutrality in the presence of ultra-rationality (Barro, 1974), 
monetary policy neutrality with rational expectations (Sargent, Wallace, 1975); 
generalized policy neutrality under rational expectations (Lucas, 1976), time-
inconsistency and the need for rules rather than discretionary public action 
(Kydland, Prescott, 1977; Barro, Gordon, 1983); need for an independent 
conservative central banker (Bade, Parkin, 1978; Rogoff, 1985, and others); 
emergence of various positions and ‘schools’ stressing the limitations of a theory, 
such as the ‘classical’ theory of economic policy, that ignores the identity of 
policymakers, their political and personal objectives, and thus the numerous 
                                                          
38
 Kærgård, Sandelin and Sæther (2008) cite the influence of K. H. Borch, who was recruited to 
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration as a professor of insurance 
from 1963 and urged his students to pursue doctoral studies in North America, thus 
weakening the influence of the Oslo School in Norwegian economics and politics. Other 
factors leading to the decline of the Oslo school are indicated by Eriksen, Hanisch and Sæther 
(2008). The disappearance of the tracts of the Swedish school due to globalisation of 
economic analysis along the lines dictated by the Anglo-Saxon schools is explained by Dixit, 
Honkapohja and Solow (1992). Dealing specifically with Sweden, but with implicit reference 
also to other countries, Jonung (2013) points out the attractions and the constraints of the 
younger generation of Swedish economists that make them publish in English, prefer 
occupations in North American universities and disregard policy issues and applications of 
theoretical thought. Jonung’s analysis applies to Italy and to other countries too. To be fair, 
Siven (1985) explains the end of the Stockholm school as due in particular to the methodology 
of the school (‘disinterest for equilibrium analysis, a preference for casuistic analysis, and 
lack of instruments for analyzing the questions posed by the School itself’; see Siven, 1985: 
592).  
39
 Economic policy is not even listed as a subject in the Journal of Economic Literature system 
of classification and only ‘macroeconomic policy’ appears as a subcategory.. 
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agency problems arising in public governance (e.g. Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1965; 
Niskanen, 1971; Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; Alesina, Tabellini, 
1990; Persson, Tabellini, 2000). 
4. The absence of theoretical advances in crucial areas of economics such 
as the theory of economic policy, after its practical demise as an effect of the 
Lucas critique.  
The first and second explanations cannot be dealt with in more detail here as 
they require specific further investigations not only for the countries we have 
referred to, but also for others. In the next section we briefly review the last two 
explanations.  
 
 
7. PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ECONOMIC POLICY AS A DISCIPLINE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ITS ‘CORE’ 
 
Any analytical discipline cannot be conceived if some minimal conditions are not 
satisfied, in particular in so far as the abstract pre-conditions for its existence are 
absent or insufficient or defective. In the case of economic policy there should be 
no ‘vital’ deficiencies in what we called its ‘core’.  
In the case of economic policy, the first such pre-condition has to do with 
recognition of existence of market failures. Other pre-conditions refer to the 
possibility or necessity of supplementing (or substituting) market decisions (as an 
institution expressing people’s preferences) with consistent and effective public 
action.  
In the period we are referring to now, no theoretical or practical objection was 
raised against market failures. By contrast, as already said, Akerlof (1970) added 
to the cases of market failures by introducing asymmetric information.  
By contrast, logical and empirical objections were moved to the other pre-
conditions as an effect of the innovations introduced in the two decades after mid-
1960s. Some such objections contributed to develop parts of economic policy and 
generated new fields of inquiry. Some others have been fatal until recently to 
survival of economic policy as an autonomous discipline and have contributed to 
its decline, while supporting the theoretical orientations of the Anglo-Saxon 
schools, referred to in the previous section.  
The most awkward part of objections to the content of economic policy dealt with 
government failures. I divide them into two types: those that can be called ‘minor’ 
failures, on the one hand, and ‘vital’ failures, on the other.  
‘Minor’ failures indicate government failures that have been emphasized by the 
‘positive’ approach to economic policy. Some criticisms of this kind had already 
been raised before 1967 and were enriched later by a copious literature. They 
stress important factors to be taken account of in practical policy together with a 
number of other institutional and historical features characterizing the country in 
question and must certainly be part of the discipline when policy action is to be 
devised in practice. These objections can be dealt partly with in analytical terms 
similar to some of those referred to ‘market failures’ (asymmetric information).  
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By ‘vital’ failures we refer instead to two objections: the impossibility of taking 
people’s preferences as a reference for public action, underlined by Arrow (1951) 
and ‘radical’ objections to effectiveness of public action of the kind raised by 
Lucas (1976).  
Let us refer to both in turn. After Arrow’s contribution, a number of economists 
showed that his ‘vital’ objection to the possibility of deriving a social welfare 
function could be healed in much more (theoretically) acceptable ways than were 
the remedies that had been provided by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1938) 
and followed by Frisch (1957), which suggested to refer such function directly to 
politicians in charge. This suggestion, in fact, delegated to political science and 
practice finding proper solutions to devising democratic institutions. already 
mentioned in section 4.
40
 These were indicated by Sen (1970) and later 
investigations, that added to the ‘possibilities’ to construct social welfare orderings 
or social ordering functions that had been indicated by Sen.
41
 More specifically, 
they are addressed by an ancillary discipline that has emerged in the more recent 
decades from previous studies, i.e. implementation theory
42
. This takes the 
incentive problem to the forefront of analysis and heavily relies on game theory, 
thus to some extent dealing also with some of the ‘minor’ problems raised by 
asymmetric information. These advances thus make the first part of the core of 
economic policy, i.e. the logic of economic policy, well founded. 
We deal now with the ‘radical’ objections concerning the effectiveness of 
economic policy. These are essentially due to introduction of expectations, in 
particular the assumption of rational expectations. Some of these objections 
tended to negate the effectiveness of policy action even in the absence of agency 
issues. In their weakest form they constrained public policy into a Nessus shirt by 
prescribing a rather rigid set of rules. Stronger versions of this kind of criticism 
negated any active role to public policy in conflict with the conduct of private 
agents.  
Until recently, these problems have been longly unaddressed, thus contributing 
in a decisive way to the decline of economic policy as an autonomous discipline. 
However, advances in the decade or so have shown that most statements of 
policy neutrality and policy prescriptions of the 1970s and 1980s were unfounded 
or of minor relevance. In more details, there have been advances reversing or 
appreciably mitigating such statements and prescriptions in the following crucial 
areas: the limited practical relevance of surprise effects, recognized by Lucas 
(1996: 679) himself; the irrelevance of many critiques to the ‘classical’ theory of 
economic policy (in particular, Tinbergen’s ‘golden rule’ about conditions to be 
satisfied for the government to control the economy and pursue its targets) based 
on rational expectations (Blinder, 1998; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 
                                                          
40
 This could be conceived only as a practical shortcut, eluding some theoretical difficulties, but 
Bergson’s suggestion was motivated by the need to avoid value judgments in scientific 
propositions. 
41
 See, e.g., Arrow, Sen, Suzumura (1997, 2002, 2011), Moulin (1988), Dryzek, List (2003), 
Bossert, Weymark (2008). 
42
 See, e.g., Jackson (2001), Maskin, Sjostrom (2002), Fleurbaey, Maniquet (2011). 
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2012); the theoretical and practical limits to time inconsistency and thus to related 
prescriptions of monetary policy rules that should replace discretionary action 
(Blinder, 1998: 56; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Hughes Hallett, 2012); existence of a 
long-run non vertical Phillips curve (Hughes Hallett, 2000; Graham, Snower, 2008; 
Benigno, Ricci, 2011; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2014a); the need for more 
active fiscal policy and regulation (especially with respect to financial markets and 
institutions) once some unrealistic assumptions of current models are ruled out; 
critique of the arguments put forward by Rogoff (1985) and Bade, Parkin (1978) 
advanced by Posen (1994) and Hayo (1998), which highlight that both political 
independence and inflation are the outcome of structural economic and social 
factors that make the central bank statutes have no impact on inflation); the need, 
in the presence of public transfers, of a rate of inflation higher than that close to 
zero rate prescribed by the consensus view of New Keynesian models (Acocella, 
Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2014b). Of special interest are two issues raised in the 
literature that have inspired recent fiscal policy attitudes against the crisis in 
Europe and the idea of limited effectiveness of fiscal policy: on the one side, a 
widespread belief in the existence of a limit beyond which an increase in public 
debt would have negative consequences on growth (Reinhart, Rogoff, 2010; 
Checherita, Rother, 2010; Kumar, Woo, 2010); on the other side, the assertion of 
very low (in the limit, null, if one accepts Barro’s proposition – see Barro, 1974) 
spending and tax multipliers. The former has recently been empirically questioned 
as a consequence of a Ph.D. investigation, but has received theoretical support by 
Checherita, Hughes Hallett, Rother (2010). The latter has passed through a long 
process of theoretical refinements, confutations and empirical evaluations, 
culminating in IMF (2010), De Grauwe (2011), Batini, Callegari and Melina (2012), 
De Long, Summers (2012), Blanchard, Leigh (2013), Semmler, Semmler (2013) 
which find higher values of the multipliers. The value of those multipliers in fact 
varies, being state dependent with respect to the conditions     of the economy 
and monetary policy stance, but is seldom small or zero or even negative. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A discipline cannot survive and spread if some pre-conditions for its existence are 
not satisfied: existence of consistent bases that prove to be resistant to practical 
and, especially, theoretical objections. The flow of continuous innovations can 
attack some such bases. ‘Minor’ objections can be incorporated into the theory. 
Unaddressed objections to its core (i.e., ‘vital’ critiques) can be fatal for its 
existence and lead to a slow or fast decay. In our case, for a discipline such as 
economic policy, the decline might be accelerated by a simultaneous and 
interacting political wave counter to it, as can be the case in particular for social 
disciplines.  
Economic policy in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Italy was mainly built as a 
discipline by collecting various innovations introduced in different fields of 
economics, mathematics and statistics (in so far as the ‘theory of economic policy’ 
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is concerned), in addition to political philosophy and political science (referring to 
welfare economics and social choice, i.e. the ‘logic’ of economic policy).  
The discipline was constituted by its ‘core’ (the logic and the theory of economic 
policy), complemented by practical applications of both microeconomic and 
macroeconomic policies, highly sensible to institutional factors. Various parts of its 
core were the object of both ‘minor’ and ‘vital’ critiques concerning existence of 
government failures. ‘Minor’ critiques – most of them of a ‘political economy’ kind - 
have been incorporated into the discipline. ‘Vital’ critiques have left the logic of 
economic policy untouched in so far as existence of market failures is concerned, 
thus setting, from this point of view, the stage for government intervention to cure 
such failures. ‘Vital’ objections have been directed instead mainly to existence of 
‘critical’ government failures. They refer to: the impossibility of taking people’s 
preferences as a reference for public action, stated by Arrow (1951) and ‘radical’ 
objections to effectiveness of public action of the kind raised by Lucas (1976). 
These critiques thus undermined the very possibility to heal market failures. These 
were confirmed (possibly enriched), but no follow up could ensue from the point of 
view of the action of an institution complementary or substitute of the market as 
could be the government. Thus the foundations of economic policy became shaky. 
Critiques to the possibility of starting from individual preferences to build some 
kind of social welfare function or rule are ‘vital’ for a democratic society when 
public action aims at substituting or complementing the market as an institution 
expressing such preferences. For some time the suggestion devised by Bergson 
(1938) and Samuelson (1947) to refer to politicians in office stating collective 
preferences was accepted (see, e.g., Zeuthen, 1958; Frisch, 1970). That solution 
meant delegating to another discipline or, even worse, to reality finding a 
fundamental link between individual preferences and public action. However, the 
‘impossibility’ objection was addressed, starting with Sen (1970), and has been 
largely overcome by a literature that is now developing in new interesting 
branches of the discipline such as implementation theory.  
The other set of ‘vital’ critiques refers to the effectiveness of policy action in 
relation to the introduction of expectations – in particular, rational expectations – 
into the analysis. When the power of Lucas critique defied part of the core of the 
discipline, i.e. the theory of economic policy, there was no possibility of 
maintaining the discipline as it had been designed in the Scandinavian countries, 
the Netherlands and Italy, possibly complemented and enriched by considerations 
of a ‘political economy’ kind. This latter set of critiques has not been addressed for 
a long time, which can contribute to explain the decline of economic policy as an 
autonomous discipline. To some extent, the very practical application of the 
discipline could have distracted its followers from further research and innovation, 
as it was certainly the case for the Stockholm school (Siven, 1985) and possibly 
also for the Oslo school (Eriksen, Hanisch and Sæther, 2008).  
Now this part of the ‘core’ has not only been shown to be exempt from the 
critique, if policy action is designed in its proper strategic context, but also to be 
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able to produce new interesting results in that context, in so far as existence, 
uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria in the game are concerned.
43
  
One could thus hope that economic policy as a consistent and autonomous 
discipline could gain momentum and challenge mainstream thought, which 
assigns a very limited role to it. This would avoid confining policy discussions to a 
few considerations following very abstract and sometimes unfounded theoretical 
reasoning that often neglect any institutional and historical element and lack the 
theoretical background deriving from the logic and the theory of economic policy. 
We are conscious however that this needs overcoming the power of some 
hysteresis in the development of economic thought that delays the dissemination 
of new ideas (Galbraith, 1987), which is not an easy task, at least in the short run. 
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